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The international economic and political environment is constantly influenced by a wide 
and dynamic set of factors which constrain and preoccupy policymakers. The various 
interdependencies that potentially exist between certain business activities and state 
decisions are difficult to assess in the complexity that characterizes the real world. Thus, 
great efforts have been made in trying to create models that reduce the variety and 
dynamic of certain observations in order to grasp the evolutions and connections between 
individual factors. The relation that exists between the activity of trade and the 
probability of engaging in a conflicting situation has long been addressed and accepted 
as consistent, though sometimes with paradoxical outcomes.  
 
This article follows these previous notions and by using games theory principles and 
methods it illustrates the situation existing in the Black Sea region by trying to create a 
model or, in this case a game, that identifies the possible outcomes in relation to certain 
economic incentives. 
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1. Introduction 
   
Trade and business development can have an important impact on policymakers, creating 
incentives for adopting certain strategies for future conduct. While there are many 
opinions regarding the exact form of the relation that exists between foreign trade and 
interstate conflicting situations, it is generally accepted that to some extent, a growth of 
the value of trade serves as an incentive for cooperation and a barrier in the way of 
misconduct and the cessation of amiable relations. 
The present article adopts principles and methods characteristic to the games theory 
methodology and creates a model or more appropriate to this construction, a game form, 
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that describes the situations that can occur between nations. By resolving and analyzing 
the outcomes in the case of Romania and its Black Sea partners, comprehensive 
conclusions can be identified and, thus, an overview of the strategic positioning in the 
area can be constructed.    
 
2. Literature review 
 
Economic factors have always determined the outcome of policies and cooperation 
between communities. While theories that  describe this interactions have only been 
proposed and accepted in the relative recent history, since ancient times peoples have 
interacted and have collided following specific interests from the gaining of territory and 
resources to bolstering personal and national prestige. Liberal theories, developed by 
Immanuel Kant have pointed out that since the appearance of democratic entities, 
cooperation has continuously grown and commerce has substituted war and occupation.  
 
Studies that analyzed pairs of nations have indicated that the relation between trade and 
conflict is negative, meaning that the intensifying of one side reduces the occurrence of 
the other (Polachek, 1980). Mainstream thinking suggests that conflict between 
neighboring countries, more than in other instances, would be greater than observed if not 
for the mitigating effect of trade (Polachek, Robst, Chang, 1999). 
 
In order to describe and assess the stability and profile of a geographical region certain 
aspects have to be taken into account, most important of these being external relations, 
economy, ethnicity and military factors (Gass, 1994).  
 
The political and military factors have to be observed and interpreted correctly so as to be 
able to construct a realistic image of the business environment in the goal of bolstering 
trade and cooperation.  
 
The level of democracy and the protection of rights are thought to be closely connected 
with economic cooperation over state boundaries. The studies have indicated results that 
democracies have a tendency to trade more intensely with each other as the flow of ideas 
are transmitted along with goods and services (Decker, Lim, 2008). 
 
Edward D. Mansfield points out that while other previous studies have focused on the 
relation between trading and conflicts, they have not analyzed the implications generated 
at the institutional level by PTA (Preferential Trading Arrangements). PTA have represent 
extra incentives for cooperation by the creating the expectation of future economic growth 
(Mansfield, 1998). Preferential groupings have institutions that help mute the military 
tensions. The same author proposes the theory that an efficient open trade system at a 
global level can only be achieved in the presence of a hegemonic state or entity. Eroding 
the position of the hegemonic entity determines a systematic closure of foreign markets 
and creates the prerequisites for seeking stability at a regional level through a form of 
PTA (Mansfield, 1998). 
Although it is sometimes assumed that being part of international economic institutions 
reduces the risk of conflicts, some studies have indicated that this is not necessarily true 
(Powers, 2006).  
Contradictory findings have also indicated that even in situations in which trade increases 
welfare and war is Pareto dominated by peace, intensifying trade flows do not lead to 
more peaceful situations. This can be attributed partially to the fact that different entities 
view problems from different perspectives, each developing and maintaining a type of 
rationality. Such may be the case in conflicts in which at least one side has other agendas 
than lucrative, economic factors, varying from religion to political ideals. Recent 
researches have suggested that trade influences the state of conflict at country level only 
above or below certain values in the flow of goods (Hamid, Sheriff, 2007). 
 
Intense bilateral trade between countries generates high opportunity costs and thus 
decreases the propensity for conflict. On the other hand, by signing multiple trading 
treaties, these costs, seen as risks can be diversified and in so doing making conflict with 
a particular entity more acceptable in economic terms (Bohmelt, 2011). 
 
Other studies have indicated that the function created by the interdependency between 
trade and conflict appears in a curvilinear form, declining to a certain point and then 
suddenly beginning to rise (Barbieri, 1996). This is generated by the fact that trade up to a 
moderate quantity reduces the probability of conflict, yet, when an extreme dependency 
on certain goods and services arises between two parties open conflict is more probable, 
careful policies being needed in order to maintain the status quo.  
 
Katherine Barbieri has emerged as a leading critic of liberal peace, the concept that 
implies that international trade reduces conflict. Although not contradicting the idea 
entirely, the author points out that while symmetric trade encourages understanding and 
cooperation, asymmetric trade, such as that existing between developed and developing 
countries leads to disequilibrium and thus to more tensions (Barbieri, 2002).  
 
Though there is no absolute consensus on the matter of trade versus conflict, a fraction of 
the theory, that trade serves as an opportunity cost to conflict seems to be accepted by 
experts in this field. A stable and intense trade flow as well as other forms of economic 
cooperation gives a state the leverage it sometimes needs to achieve its goals.  
 
While the asymmetric trade or the asymmetric position by military strength of trading 
partners can in some instances increase the probability of tensions, it does not mean that 
trade should be restricted or limited, but rather that the policies that accompany it should 





3. Model definition 
 
By adopting the principles of games theory into the process of decision making in foreign 
relations, if rationality is accepted and viewed by all sides in the same manner, every 
conflict in history can be placed in accordance to a single equilibrium formula between 
the world countries:  
 
 
K*(S+R+D) = T+R+D                                                                                   Equation (1) 
 
K – Relative strength of the nation, calculated as the ratio between the defense budget of 
the particular country and the overall defense budget of the two opposing countries
i; 
S – Stake for dispute or value gained if conflict is won; 
R – Reputation of a country; 
D – Infrastructure and investment in defense forces; 
T – Value of trade between countries; 
 
The equation could be expanded to take into consideration the value generated by tourism 
between the two countries, the foreign investment taking place in peace time, 
international aid and technological exchanges. The arguments of liberal theories are that 
democratic nations resolve their disputes in accordance with their rational interests and 
not through the manifestation of personal ambitions such as might be  the case in 
autocratic systems of government (Ye, 2002).   
 
While this relatively complex equation could prove difficult to calculate in any practical 
example without restricting some of the factors, it indicates the rational, lucrative way of 
deciding if conflict and its benefits are superior to the rewards of maintaining the peaceful 
relation which allows for trade, change of ideas and also preserves the existing defenses 
of a state and improves its international standing.  
 
The type of game proposed for this analysis is that of static game in complete 
information. Considering the fact that the game is static, it means that a perfectly rational 
player, in this game a policymaker, would not be interested in the change of reputation, as 
the game will not repeat. Hence the value for reputation variation for all nations, 
regardless of the strategy adopted, will be zero.  
 
Thus, the relation for general equilibrium becomes: 
 
K*(S+D) = T+D                                                                                                 Equation (2) 
 
The analysis does not take into account the actions derived by the decisions of third 
parties which could also break relations and stop trading in the advent of open conflict. 
 
The available strategies for each of the players are either to enter into a conflict or to try to 
engage in trade. The benefits of trade can only appear in situations in which both players 
choose to do so. If both players decide to enter into a conflict, the winnings will be 
represented by a portion (depending on the K value) of the stake for conflict cumulated 
with the existing defense
ii. If one player chooses conflict and the other does not respond 
in the same way, the aggressor will gain the entire stake, retain its defense infrastructure 
and capability, and the other only gains the possibility to keep its defenses intact. 
 
The following matrix is a normal form representation of a game in which players move 
simultaneously, without receiving information of the other’s moves before making their 
own, and receive the payoffs as specified for the combinations of actions played:  
Table no.1 - Normal form game for conflict to trade relation 
  Player 2 chooses conflict 
(C) 
Player 2 chooses trade (T) 
Player 1 chooses conflict 
(C) 
K*(S+D1) , (1-K)*(S+D2)  S+D1 , D2 
Player 1 chooses trade (T)  D1 , S+D2  T+D1, T+D2 
 
The outcome and interpretation of the mentioned game can only be achieved through a 
discussion based on the values attributed to the stake for conflict, defense budgets and 
trade flow (S, D1, D2, T)
iii. 
 
Situation 1 – S>T, S>D1, S>D2   
Table no.2 - Normal form game for conflict to trade relation under the restrictions S>T, 
S>D1, S>D2   
  Player 2 chooses conflict 
(C) 
Player 2 chooses trade (T) 
Player 1 chooses conflict 
(C) 
K*(S+D1) , (1-K)*(S+D2)  S+D1 , D2 
Player 1 chooses trade (T)  D1 , S+D2  T+D1, T+D2 
 
If the stake for conflict is larger than the possible trade flow and both of the defense 
budgets, then the strategy of trade is dominated by the strategy for conflict meaning that 
in this game both players will always chose to engage in an aggressive dispute. The 
solution for the game would be (C, C). 
 
Situation 2 – S>T, S>D1, S<D2   
Table no.3 - Normal form game for conflict to trade relation under the restrictions S>T, 
S>D1, S<D2 
  Player 2 chooses conflict 
(C) 
Player 2 chooses trade (T) 
Player 1 chooses conflict 
(C) 
K*(S+D1) , (1-K)*(S+D2)  S+D1 , D2 
Player 1 chooses trade (T)  D1 , S+D2  T+D1, T+D2 
   
In this instance the stake for conflict is larger trade and larger than the defenses of the first 
player, but smaller than those of the second one, the solution for the game, by using the 
method of maximizing the relative gains, would be (T, C). This means that under such 
conditions, the first player will always choose to trade while the other will always prefer 
conflict. 
 
Situation 3 – S>T, S<D1, S>D2 
Table no.4 - Normal form game for conflict to trade relation under the restrictions S>T, 
S<D1, S>D2 
  Player 2 chooses conflict  Player 2 chooses trade (T)  
 
(C) 
Player 1 chooses conflict 
(C) 
K*(S+D1) , (1-K)*(S+D2)  S+D1 , D2 
Player 1 chooses trade (T)  D1 , S+D2  T+D1, T+D2 
 
This case is symmetrical to the previous one, the solution being (C, T). The first player 
will chose the strategy to engage in conflict and the latter will choose to trade. 
 
Situation 4 – S>T, S<D1, S<D2 
Table no.5 - Normal form game for conflict to trade relation under the restrictions S>T, 
S<D1, S<D2 
  Player 2 chooses conflict 
(C) 
Player 2 chooses trade (T) 
Player 1 chooses conflict 
(C) 
K*(S+D1) , (1-K)*(S+D2)  S+D1 , D2 
Player 1 chooses trade (T)  D1 , S+D2  T+D1, T+D2 
 
In this particular case there are two solutions in pure strategies, (C, T) and (T, C), 
meaning that another must exist in mixed strategies. Thus positive probabilities have to be 
associated to the above pure strategies in order to obtain a solution.  
 
The equations that are formed are as follows: 
Q1*K*(S+D1) + Q2*(S+D1) = Q1*D1+Q2*(T+D2)                                     Equation (3) 
Q1 + Q2 = 1                                                                                                      Equation (4) 
P1* (1-K)*(S+D2) + P2*(S+D2) = P1* D2 + P2*(T+D2)                              Equation (5) 
P1 + P2 = 1                                                                                                       Equation (6) 
 
The solution for the above system is: 
Q1 = (T-S)/(KS+D1K-D1+T-S) 
Q2 = 1- (T-S)/(KS+KD1-D1+T-S) 
P1 = (T-S)/(T-KS-KD2) 
P2 = 1- (T-S)/(T-KS-KD2) 
 
Situation 5 – S<T, S<D1, S<D2 
Table no.6 - Normal form game for conflict to trade relation under the restrictions S<T, 
S<D1, S<D2 
  Player 2 chooses conflict 
(C) 
Player 2 chooses trade (T) 
Player 1 chooses conflict 
(C) 
K*(S+D1) , (1-K)*(S+D2)  S+D1 , D2 
Player 1 chooses trade (T)  D1 , S+D2  T+D1, T+D2 
 
In this situation the stake for conflict is smaller than the trade flow and also smaller than 
both of the defense budgets, the strategy for conflict is dominated by the strategy for 
trade. Both players will always engage in trade, the solution being (T, T).  
Situation 6 – S<T, S<D1, S>D2 
Table no.7 - Normal form game for conflict to trade relation under the restrictions S<T, 
S<D1, S>D2 
  Player 2 chooses conflict 
(C) 
Player 2 chooses trade (T) 
Player 1 chooses conflict 
(C) 
K*(S+D1) , (1-K)*(S+D2)  S+D1 , D2 
Player 1 chooses trade (T)  D1 , S+D2  T+D1, T+D2 
 
When trade is larger than the stake for conflict and only the first defense budget is larger 
than the stake, then the solution determined through the maximum relative gains method 
is (T, T). 
 
Situation 7– S<T, S>D1, S<D2 
Table no.8 - Normal form game for conflict to trade relation under the restrictions S<T, 
S>D1, S<D2 
  Player 2 chooses conflict 
(C) 
Player 2 chooses trade (T) 
Player 1 chooses conflict 
(C) 
K*(S+D1) , (1-K)*(S+D2)  S+D1 , D2 
Player 1 chooses trade (T)  D1 , S+D2  T+D1, T+D2 
   
This situation is symmetrical to the latter and thus the solution is (T, T). Both players will 
engage in trade. 
 
Situation 8 – S<T, S>D1, S>D2 
Table no.9 - Normal form game for conflict to trade relation under the restrictions S<T, 
S>D1, S>D2 
  Player 2 chooses conflict 
(C) 
Player 2 chooses trade (T) 
Player 1 chooses conflict 
(C) 
K*(S+D1) , (1-K)*(S+D2)  S+D1 , D2 
Player 1 chooses trade (T)  D1 , S+D2  T+D1, T+D2 
   
Once more, for this situation, the game admits two solutions in pure strategies in the form 
of (C,C) and (T,T). The solution in mixed strategies implies the utilization of the set of 
probabilities that resulted in situation number 4.  
 
4. Results analysis 
 
The above situations and their respective solutions can be applied to multiple pairs of 
countries in order to assess the inclination for trade or for conflict as suggested by the 
model. For this particular analysis in the purpose of establishing the situation for 
Romania, its data will be introduced in the game in relation to the data of the main Black 
Sea Countries. Trade will be considered as the value of the trade flow between the  
 
countries in 2010, the defense budgets are calculated for all the countries in the same 
year
iv and the stake for conflict will be established from the start as 1 billion EURO. 
  Table no.10 - Game between Romania and Ukraine  
(mil EUR) 
Ukraine  
C  T 
Romania 
C   1942, 926   3177, 1383 
T   2177, 2383   3012, 2219 
 
The game is in the form proposed in situation number 4, the case in which there are two 
solutions in pure strategies and one in mixed strategies. By applying the above results, the 
probabilities are: 
Q1 = 0.41; Q2 = 0.59; P1 = 0.26; P2 = 0.74  
  Table no.11 – Game between Romania and Moldova 
(mil EUR) 
Moldova  
C  T 
Romania 
C   3154, 7   3177, 15 
T   2177, 1015   2654, 493 
 
This game falls under the restrictions of situation number 3 in which the first country will 
always choose the conflict strategy and the latter will choose the trade strategy. Because 
the gains of conflict are so small for Moldova, in this type of game it would prefer to 
maintain its defenses and not attack. 
   Table no.12 – Game between Romania and the Russian Federation 
(mil EUR) 
Russia 
C  T 
Romania 
C   158, 40544   3177, 41663 
T   2177, 42663  4580, 44066 
   
The game fits into situation number 5, meaning that the solution is represented by (T,T). 
Both countries will choose the trade strategy. 
Table no.13 - Game between Romania and Turkey 
(mil EUR) 
Turkey 
C  T 
Romania 
C  230, 26857  3177, 27949 
T  2177, 28949  5659, 31432 
 
For both nations, the conflict strategy is strictly dominated by the trading strategy, 
meaning that the game falls under the restrictions of situation 5. 
  Table no.14 – Game between Romania and Bulgaria 
(mil EUR) 
Bulgaria 
C  T 
Romania 
C  2290, 515  3177, 843 
T  2177, 1843  3377, 2043 
   The game falls into the situation number 6 and the solution is (T, T). Both countries will 
engage in trade rather than adopting the conflict strategy. 
 
5. Conclusions 
   
Trade as well as other forms of economic cooperation represents a strong incentive for 
peace in any region. The model underlines the possible game situations in which countries 
can find themselves when deciding what strategy to adopt. The model is simplified 
mainly by the fact that it does not take into consideration the response that third party 
states can take in some cases and also the due to the fact that it does not portray an 
ongoing situation where the current strategy will determine latter responses and possible 
changes to the form of the game. 
 
By establishing the stake for a possible conflict at 1000 million Euros (keeping in mind 
that the model could easily generate other correct situations by choosing a different 
incentive) and by applying a static game of complete information, Romania finds itself in 
a (Trade, Trade) solution with the Russian Federation, Turkey and Bulgaria while at the 
same time in a (Conflict, Trade) solution with Moldova and a mixed strategy solution 
with Ukraine in the form of: ((0.26,0.74) (0.41,0.59)). 
 
The model indicates the fact that a solution based on mutual trade and cooperation can 
only arise when the trade flow is larger than the stake for a dispute. The disparities in 
defense budgets and also those between the defense budgets and the stake of conflict are 
very important as they can dictate whether a country would choose to be aggressive or 
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i Serving as example, the K value for Romania in relation to the Russian Federation is calculated as 
the ratio between Romania’s defense budget and the sum between Romania’s defense budget and 
that of the Russian Federation; 
ii Depending on the K value, each player will win a portion of the stake and by engaging in conflict 
will also loose a portion of its military capabilities; 
iii D1 represents the defense budget of state no. 1 and D2 the defense budget of state no. 2; 
iv The last year available for all countries analyzed is 2006. In order for the data to be comparable 
the same year had to be chosen for all states. 